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Gaming the FTSE 100 Index 
Abstract 
In the UK (unlike the US and many other countries), companies enter and exit the main stock 
market index (FTSE 100) according to a clear set of rules based on market capitalisation. 
This creates an opportunity to game the system to secure or retain FTSE membership by 
manipulating capitalisation. There is considerable evidence in extant studies that index 
membership is beneficial, both for shareholders and managers. Hence, companies may adopt 
financial strategies designed to acquire or retain membership. We investigate two types of 
gaming. We define strategic gaming as a situation in which companies, which may initially 
be a number of places away from the boundary, make abnormal share issues cumulatively 
over several quarters. We find strong supportive evidence for this. For tactical gaming, which 
would involve companies in the very closest proximity to the boundary, we do not. Our 
analysis shows that gaming is limited to companies outside the index trying to get in. 
Companies that are close to exit do not game to retain their index place. The high natural 
volatility of market capitalisation makes success of gaming uncertain. Our central estimate is 
that about 5% of entries to the index appear to be the result of gaming. 
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Gaming the FTSE 100 Index 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether quoted companies in the UK manage their market 
capitalisations to gain entry, or avoid relegation, from the main stock market index, the FTSE 
100. There is a very substantial empirical literature suggesting that membership of major 
stock market indices increases a company’s share price and therefore lowers its cost of 
capital. Under these circumstances, membership becomes a valuable asset for companies. We 
would expect, other factors equal, that they would, where possible, actively seek to acquire 
this asset.  
It is well established that companies manipulate their earnings and accruals 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), manage their own reward systems (Burns and Kedia, 2006; 
Heron and Lie, 2007), manage forex prices and interest rates (banks) (Gandhi et al., 2016; 
Ryder, 2014), and manipulate contract bids (Connor, 2011). Why should they not manage the 
FTSE system too? If there are specific rules which identify companies to be added and 
removed from the index, management can attempt to game the system by pushing their 
company to the front of the queue. Using data relating to the FTSE 100 index in the UK, this 
paper explores the evidence for such managerial index gaming. To our knowledge, this 
particular game has not been identified in the literature before. 
The paper is structured as follows. We start by looking at the significance of indexing 
in current equity markets. Then we shall briefly review the arguments and evidence for 
downward-sloping equity demand curves. If demand is downward-sloping, the extra demand 
from index-tracking funds would generate higher share prices and lower costs of equity 
capital for FTSE 100 member companies. Under these circumstances, companies, acting in 
the interest of their shareholders, should be expected to actively seek membership. We shall 
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also review the empirical evidence for share price and other changes associated with index 
membership changes. We shall explain the rules governing entry and exit from the FTSE 100, 
noting that the rules in the UK are very different from those in the US. Our hypothesis that 
companies manage entry would not make sense in the US system.  We then set out our 
hypotheses, which relate both to strategic gaming (initiated when a company may be a 
number of places from the margin) and tactical gaming (undertaken when the company is in 
very close proximity to the boundary for index inclusion). We test them using data from 2005 
to 2012. Finally, we consider possible explanations for the management behaviour we 
uncover.  
 
2. The significance of indices 
The practical significance of indices has been greatly enhanced by academic theories. 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Capital Asset Pricing Model have encouraged a 
passive style of investing based on a portfolio that includes the full set of risky assets 
available in the market, weighted by their market capitalisations. 
The practical consequence of these developments has been that index-tracking funds 
now hold a significant portion of the global equity pool. In the US, the percentage rose from 
11.4% in 2003 to about 18.4% in 2013 (Doshi et al., 2015), while in the UK, 20% of the 
market was in fully passive strategies in 2014 (Investment Association Asset Management 
Survey, 2015). Passive funds now account for about 20% of global fund management assets, 
and while assets under management in active funds grew by 54% to $24trn between 2007 and 
2016, funds in passive mutual funds grew by 230% to $6trn over the same period, amid 
concerns about bad performance and high fees of active funds (Mooney, 2016). 
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These numbers, however, understate the significance of index membership for 
investment decisions. There is evidence of substantial ‘closet indexing’ (Authers, 2014; 
Duncan, 2015). Petajisto (2013) reports that it has been increasing in popularity and now 
accounts for about one third of all mutual fund assets in the US. Using information from 
several sources, Madison (2016) estimates that a third of UK funds and 55% of Swedish 
funds are potential closet trackers. Basak and Pavlova (2013) show that even benchmarking 
against an index, a very widespread practice, can be expected to tilt a portfolio in the 
direction of shares included in that index. These facts show that entry to the main index used 
for index-tracking will generate substantial new demand for the shares affected (and exit will 
cause a substantial source of demand to disappear). How will this affect the share price and 
the incentive for companies to be included in the index? 
 
3. Demand curves for equities 
In a market with perfect symmetrical information, we would expect highly elastic, 
nearly flat, demand curves for individual shares. Investors could find close substitutes for 
shares removed from the open market by index trackers. However, the diversity of investor 
portfolios and the volume of investor trading suggest a very different market environment. 
Scholes (1972), Miller (1977) and Levin and Wright (2006) all make the argument for 
downward-sloping demand curves in the context of heterogeneous beliefs. Merton (1987) 
offers a detailed theoretical analysis of how incomplete information can be expected to 
produce a market in which the prices (and returns) on individual shares will vary with the 
number of investors interested in purchasing them. Several authors have estimated demand 
elasticities (see e.g., Shleifer, 1986; Ahern, 2014). Petajisto (2009, p. 1015) concludes that 
“(index and) non-index evidence points in the same direction: demand curves for individual 
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stocks are steep in general”. Petajisto (2011) finds that elasticity increases with firm size and 
decreases with idiosyncratic risk. With downward-sloping demand, it can be expected that 
index entry, by reducing the quantity available in the open market, will raise share prices and 
index exit will lower them. The downward-sloping demand argument is often referred to in 
the literature as the imperfect substitutes hypothesis. It is central to our argument, but it is 
only one of several models of index entry and exit, which we review next. A number of them 
could be used to motivate our hypotheses.  
 
4. Index Effects and Motives for Firms Seeking Index Membership 
Prior literature examines the impact of index entry and exit on company share prices, 
and various theories have been put forward to explain the stock market reaction to companies 
gaining or losing membership of main stock market indices. Below we review some of the 
main theories and evidence on index effects, which may motivate a desire for companies to 
gain index membership. 
 
4.1 Imperfect Substitution 
One of the most widely cited early studies of the price reaction when a stock joins the 
S&P 500 is by Shleifer (1986). Along with many S&P studies, he only looks at additions; the 
effects of removal cannot generally be studied because the companies disappear. Shleifer 
finds a first day ‘pop’ of 2.79% when companies joined the index, and his results suggest that 
the price rise is permanent. In the absence of homogeneous information, stocks may face a 
downward-sloping demand curve from non-tracking investors. When the company joins the 
index, tracking funds remove a slice of the issued stock from the market, shifting the supply 
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curve for non-tracking investors to the left. The remaining equity finds its equilibrium price 
higher up the demand curve. If shares outside the index are seen as imperfect substitutes for 
those inside, there exists a clear motivation for companies to actively seek index membership. 
A more recent study in this vein is Chang and Hong (2015) who find a price movement of 
about 5% when stocks gain demand by moving into a new index. There is additional evidence 
for downward-sloping demand from index changes whose effect is not contaminated by 
possible information changes. Petajisto (2009) refers to the removal of foreign companies 
from the S&P 500 in 2002, and Kaul et al. (2000) look at the re-weighting of the Toronto 
TSE 300 in 1996. In both cases it is difficult to interpret the significant price changes as being 
other than demand related. If index membership leads to permanently higher demand for a 
company’s shares, and thereby higher share prices and lower cost of equity capital, index 
membership will be desirable. 
 
4.2 Price Pressure 
Harris and Gurel (1986) find an immediate gain from S&P membership of 3.13%, 
while Mase (2007) finds abnormal returns of approximately 4% when firms are added to the 
FTSE 100 index. However, in both studies the price rise is found to be temporary. Harris and 
Gurel (1986) argue that the sudden extra demand generated by tracking funds is satisfied by 
high cost suppliers of extra liquidity. These liquidity suppliers sell on the effective date and 
restore their own investment positions by buying as the price comes back to its equilibrium 
level. The findings of Harris and Gurel (1986) and Mase (2007) of only a short-term price 
pressure effect from index inclusion suggest that companies should take a neutral view of 
entry or exit from an index. 
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4.3 Information and Liquidity Effects 
Despite the assertions of S&P, there may be information content in the announcement 
that a specific share is to join the index. Dhillon and Johnson (1991) find that trading volume 
increases after entry is announced, and that the effect is still evident one year later. They 
argue that, once within the index, a company may be subject to closer scrutiny and agency 
costs may fall. If trading volume (and liquidity) rises, spreads may fall and this, logically, 
will increase the current value of the share. Members of the index would see a permanent 
increase in value. 
For the FTSE 100 it is practical to look at both additions and deletions, and it is 
appropriate to look at movements before the announcement date because both entry and exit 
can be foreseen. Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006) find excess returns of 11% over the 5 day 
period centred on the announcement day, but these are partly reversed over the following 
months. For deletions, the 5-day excess returns are -7.4%, with share prices continuing to 
fall. Gregoriou and Ioanidis (2006) argue that the permanent change in prices is associated 
with changes in information costs and liquidity. Mazouz et al. (2014), using FTSE 100 data, 
also show that index entry enhances all aspects of liquidity and that liquidity is priced. The 
resulting price rise is permanent. However, being relegated from the index does not result in a 
reversal of the liquidity or price changes. The increase in liquidity and associated increase in 
share prices from index membership provides another motive for companies seeking to get 
into the FTSE 100 index. There is, however, mixed evidence as to whether or not being 
relegated from the index has a permanent negative impact on liquidity and share prices.  
 
9 
 
4.4 Price Volatility 
Dunn et al. (2008) find that, although additions to the FTSE 100 index exhibit positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (about 3%) prior to the effective date, this is followed by a long 
period of negative abnormal returns. Deletions show a mirror image of this effect, although 
the movement before day 0 is stronger (-5%) and the subsequent recovery weaker. Stocks in a 
widely tracked index have a significant proportion of their market capitalisation locked away, 
and the traded capitalisation is smaller. Contrary to other studies finding index inclusion to 
have a positive impact on liquidity, Dunn et al. (2008) find that for additions, the shares 
become more volatile and less liquid, and the long-term effect on prices to be negative. 
Cooper and Woglom (2003) confirm that volatility increases when a share is added to the 
S&P 500 index. The authors suggest that the increased volatility is responsible for a price 
decline after the initial announcement increase. If index membership leads to higher price 
volatility and lower share prices, index membership would arguably be best avoided. 
 
4.5 Awareness and Coverage 
Mase (2007) finds that, around the time of a firm being added to the FTSE 100 index, 
the average number of analysts rises from 5.92 to 7.24, and for deletions, coverage falls from 
5.92 to 3.26. Analysts do not initiate or terminate coverage on a short-term basis. They 
obviously expect index membership to have a long-term impact. Several authors report 
effects from joining the S&P. Chen et al. (2004) find that the total number of shareholders 
rises substantially (and the number of institutional owners rises too) when a company is 
added, but does not fall so significantly when it leaves. They argue that investors become 
aware of a company when it joins the index; they do not become unaware when it leaves. 
Denis et al. (2003) suggest that S&P additions enjoy significant improvements in the 
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accuracy of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. They suggest that closely monitored index 
members may have better and cheaper access to the capital markets. Elliott et al. (2006) also 
conclude that substantial price changes associated with index entry are permanent and 
primarily associated with increased investor awareness. Chan et al. (2013) confirm that there 
are long-term effects from index membership, and also attribute them mainly to improved 
liquidity associated with greater analyst coverage. Awareness and liquidity are closely related 
in the literature. This evidence suggests that companies obtain benefits from index 
membership. 
 
4.6 Earnings Quality 
Platikanova (2008) looks at earnings quality for companies that join the S&P Index. 
Focusing on accruals, she shows that when companies join the index, discretionary accruals 
fall (i.e., there is a more conservative accounting policy), earnings become higher quality, and 
this reduces information risk and increases the share price. Platikanova (2008) argues that this 
is a permanent effect and that shares added to the index outperform for at least three years 
after the event. Again, this evidence suggests that index membership is beneficial to 
shareholders. 
 
4.7 Managerial Issues 
It is also possible that executives and directors might have personal reasons for seeking 
entry. There is considerable status associated with senior positions in FTSE 100 companies. 
The benefits may, however, go beyond mere status. Studying compensation data for UK 
CEOs and executive directors, Geiler and Renneboog (2015, p. 351) find “…strong positive 
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relation between firm size and remuneration: executive directors in the FTSE100 firms earn 
almost the double than FTSE250 executives, three times as much as executives of FTSE 
Smallcaps, and about five times as much as the executives of FTSE Fledglings”. Main and 
Hine (2012) also study the determinants of executive pay in the UK and find index inclusion 
to have a significant impact on executive pay, even when controlling for firm size, share 
performance and director characteristics, using firm fixed effects and year dummies. Main 
and Hine (2012, p. 9) find that “Current membership of one of the FTSE indices is, of itself, a 
powerful positive influence on earnings”. The coefficient on FTSE100 is significantly larger 
than that for FTSE250, suggesting that executive pay, after controlling for other variables, is 
significantly higher when firms are in the FTSE 100 than when they are not. This suggests 
managers would have personal incentives to ensure their firm gains or maintains membership 
of the FTSE 100 index, irrespective of whether index membership is beneficial to 
shareholders or not. 
 
4.8 Press Comment 
In 2011 and 2012 there was concern in the UK about foreign companies (mainly from 
the former Soviet Union) which had obtained entry to the FTSE 100 despite a low free float 
and corporate governance structures which were not subject to UK control. The FTSE 
organisation proposed to change the rules to exclude them. The reaction from the businesses 
affected was swift and hostile. The Financial Times carried articles such as “(Polymetal’s) 
founder talks about why he has set his sights on the FTSE 100” (Kavanagh, 2011) and 
“Resolution has hit out at a planned clampdown on unconventional corporate structures 
which threatens the life assurance group’s position in the FTSE 100 index” (Gray, 2012, p. 
12 
 
23). It is clear from articles such as these that managers often have a strong desire for their 
firm to be included in the FTSE 100 index.  
 
4.9 Literature Conclusion 
As is so often the case, this substantial body of literature contains varied and sometimes 
contradictory arguments and findings as to whether companies benefit from being a 
constituent firm in a major stock market index such as the FTSE 100. Overall, however, we 
would endorse the view of Chan et al. (2013, p. 4921), who conclude their review of current 
literature with the statement that “Clearly there are several fundamental reasons to expect a 
permanent, long-term price effect from the addition of a stock to the index. …the driving 
factors for added stocks should work in the opposite direction for deleted stocks”. This would 
suggest that companies, maybe particularly those around the boundary for index inclusion, 
would have incentives to try to manage their market capitalisation so as to gain or maintain 
index membership, or to avoid being dropped from the index. This motivates our hypothesis. 
 
5.  FTSE Index Entry and Exit 
For the FTSE 100, the selection process is objective. All 90 largest eligible firms by 
market capitalisation are automatically included. If any index stock moves below the 110th 
position, it is automatically excluded at the next review and the largest non-index stock takes 
its place. At any point in time, therefore, the index will consist of the top 90 shares by market 
capitalisation at the beginning of the quarter plus 10 further shares drawn from those that 
were ranked, at the beginning the quarter, between 91 and 110. The system leads, on average, 
to 2 or 3 changes at each quarterly review.  
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Because additions and deletions in the UK follow an automatic rule, investors can 
make very good guesses about constituent changes in advance of the formal announcement. 
The automatic rule used in the UK raises the possibility that company management might 
game the system by making positive abnormal capitalisation changes when they are at risk of 
being ejected from the index, or when they are close to being admitted. We shall test whether 
this is in fact the case. 
It is worth noting that the situation in the US is quite different. The main index used 
for tracking and benchmarking there is the S&P 500. There are no regular reviews of 
membership. Firms leave the index when they are acquired, go bankrupt, or, rarely, undergo 
some restructuring that makes them unsuitable to continue in the index. The S&P index 
committee holds a secret list of approved firms and, when one firm leaves, a successor is 
announced to take its place. Although the S&P committee is clear that the firms on the 
reserve list have not been selected for their potential investment returns, it is sometimes 
argued that the selection criteria (which include financial viability) may in fact convey 
information about investment quality. Some of the American literature, not discussed above, 
suggests that this implicit information may be a driver of the index effect in the US. There is 
no subjective selection, and no possible information effect, in the UK. The hypothesis of this 
paper – that firms might manage their entry to the index – would make no sense in a US 
context. 
 
6. The Index Game  
In this paper we test the hypothesis that companies game the FTSE system by 
abnormally increasing their number of issued shares, and hence their market capitalisations, 
when they are close to entry or exit from the FTSE 100 index. Share issuance is, of course, 
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not the only way in which companies can change their capitalisations. They might fail to 
make buy-backs that they would otherwise have made, or reduce their dividend payments. 
Regular dividends are traditionally stable from year to year and unsuitable for index 
manipulation. Special dividends are rare and have the effect of reducing capitalisation. If 
companies are going to artificially increase their market capitalisations to trigger FTSE 
entrance (or avoid exit), evidence for this should show up in the pattern of share issuance and 
redemption.  
In proposing this hypothesis, we are assuming that issuing new shares will, in fact, 
increase the firm’s market capitalisation. It is possible that the share price might react so 
negatively to the announcement of the new issue that the expected increase in capitalisation is 
not actually achieved. Bali et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between issuance and 
returns for most of the countries in their sample, but with a notable exception for larger 
capitalisation UK stocks. This result might be related to information flow implications of the 
issues. An issue made with the intention of entering the FTSE index, if this intention was 
identified by investors, would presumably not carry significant information implications. 
Armitage (2012) finds discount-adjusted returns for UK firms are insignificantly negative for 
rights issues and significantly positive for the more numerous open offers and placings. 
Transactions costs might also influence the desirability of issues and redemptions. It should 
be noted that firms can increase their number of shares without making any sort of formal 
issue, by using shares as consideration for minor acquisitions or creating new shares to 
redeem executive share options. 
Our basic hypothesis can be derived from several possible motivating factors. If 
management believes in either the imperfect substitution, or the information and liquidity 
arguments, or if they are persuaded by the evidence relating to awareness and coverage, they 
can be expected to actively seek to be included in the Index if their company’s market 
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capitalisation is in the vicinity of the boundary for being included in the Index, as being 
included in the Index will enhance the wealth of their shareholders and reduce their cost of 
equity capital. A company’s CEO and senior managers might also seek membership because 
it will increase their personal compensation. If, on the other hand, they believe in the price 
volatility argument, they would be expected actively to avoid membership. Systematic 
avoidance behaviour would also show up in our tests. Although, as so often, the empirical 
evidence is not unanimous, our hypothesis that firms close to the boundary may try to game 
the system so as to gain entry or avoid exit from the FTSE 100 is well grounded in both 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
We shall test whether companies in the vicinity of the FTSE 100 boundary show an 
unusual propensity to make large share issuances. Given the transparent rules for index 
membership, allowing for potential gaming, we hypothesise that companies close to the 
boundary for inclusion or in danger of dropping out of the index are more likely to undertake 
large share issues than firms either safely within the index, or so far below the boundary that 
membership of the index is unlikely. We note that the FTSE rules mean that a company 
which just succeeds in gaining FTSE membership has a more secure asset than one that just 
evades exit. Also, the awareness argument suggests that the gains associated with entry may 
not be lost on exit. Based on these two arguments, we test both to see whether companies are 
active in seeking to acquire membership and also whether they manage their capitalisation to 
stay in the index when they are close to exit. 
Gaming can arguably take place in different ways, and we test two distinct variants. 
One is strategic gaming, where a company whose market capitalisation may initially be some 
distance away from the boundary for FTSE100 index membership, pursues its objective 
through large scale issuance over a number of quarters. The other is tactical or opportunistic 
gaming, where a company finding itself in very close proximity to the boundary boosts its 
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capitalisation to grasp entry (or avoid exit).These two variants of the game are not 
alternatives. We may find evidence of both, or neither, and we test them separately. 
Tests for strategic gaming use a data-set of the 200 largest FTSE-eligible companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. Tests for tactical gaming use a data set of near-
boundary companies. Our tests are based on the ten smallest companies in the index (proxins) 
and the ten largest companies outside it (proxouts). As a by-product of these tests, we expect 
to estimate the number of companies that, over the eight years of our data, have achieved or 
retained FTSE membership by gaming. 
 
7. Data and Methods 
We examine the propensity of management to use capitalisation changes to gain entry 
to the FTSE 100 index. We collect quarterly market value, number of shares in issue, and 
share price data for companies from Datastream. Data was collected from March 2005 to 
December 2012, giving a total of 32 quarters. Datastream does not directly indicate 
membership of FTSE indices or the ranking of companies within the index. The most 
convenient source for data giving both market capitalisation and FTSE membership 
information is the Stockchallenge (SC) website, which was created to facilitate a ‘play the 
stock market’ game. We have confirmed the SC data by checking market capitalisation data 
against Datastream and entries and exits to the Index against the London Stock Exchange 
quarterly review of index constituents. The SC website ranks companies by market 
capitalisation and indicates membership of the FTSE 100 or the FTSE 250. 
We examine whether companies have an increased propensity to issue stock when in 
proximity to the index boundary, i.e., as the company approaches entry to or exit from the 
17 
 
FTSE 100 index. The proximity to the index boundary is determined separately for 
companies inside and outside the index. For companies inside the index, but proximate to exit 
(proxins), we begin by sorting index constituents in a particular quarter in terms of their 
market capitalisation. We exclude companies which have been identified by SC as automatic 
exits at the next review of the list of index constituents. We then rank companies from -1 to -
10, with -1 as the nearest (non-automatic) FTSE 100 listed company to exit from the index. 
We then repeat this process to identify the nearest companies outside of the index (proxouts). 
We rank companies outside the index by market capitalisation and then, excluding automatic 
entries, code the nearest company to being in the index as 1 and the tenth nearest as 10.1 The 
actual company in any given position will be different for each quarterly set of data. 
Companies are very unlikely to find themselves in the same rank positions in consecutive 
quarters. To assess the change in index position over time, we examine the six quarters after 
each ranking quarter (Quarter 0).  
Our hypothesis is that companies close to the margin for FTSE100 entry or exit will 
increase their market capitalisations to increase their chances of getting or staying in. To test 
this, we have calculated the Share Inflation Factor (SIF) for the companies in our database. 
The SIF for quarter Q is defined as  
SIF(Q) =
NOSI(Q) –  NOSI(0)
NOSI(0)
 
where NOSI(0) and NOSI(Q) refers to the number of shares in issue at quarter Q and quarter 
0, respectively, with appropriate adjustments being made for stock splits. SIF therefore 
measures decisions by companies to change their market capitalisations by issuing or 
repurchasing shares. 
                                                          
1 Note that for each automatic exit there will be a corresponding automatic entry to maintain the number of 
companies in the index. 
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In our data-set, Q takes on the values +1 to +6. We look at adjustments to the share 
count up to six quarters after a company has occupied a particular position in the size 
rankings. A positive SIF means that the number of shares is rising. 
 
8. Characteristics of the Data Set 
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for market capitalisations and SIFs of index 
boundary companies (ranked 91 to 110 inclusive) and market capitalisations at ranks 90 and 
111. Notice that the mean market capitalisation at rank 90 is 32.3% higher than at rank 111. 
In very broad terms, market capitalisation tends to rise by about 1.4% for every step up the 
size-ranking list. A company that automatically enters the FTSE 100 index at rank 90 
therefore has a substantial capitalisation cushion before it would automatically exit at rank 
111. One implication of this is that the incentive for companies nearing the boundary for 
entry to gain entry is stronger than the incentive for firms close to exit to fight to stay in 
(where the company is likely to stay in peril even if it temporarily avoids the drop). 
Table 1 about here 
SIF statistics are shown for one, two, four and six quarters. On average, they are 
slightly positive. Note the substantial SIF standard deviations. The mean one quarter SIF is 
less than 0.1%, but the standard deviation is almost 5%. Note that the maximum Q+1 SIF is 
9.6 standard deviations from the mean, and the minimum is 6.5 standard deviations away. 
Many companies have zero SIFs. The distribution is clearly leptokurtic. For this reason, non-
parametric Chi-squared tests are used, where appropriate. As one would expect, SIFs tend to 
be larger, and to have a larger standard deviation, over longer time periods. We look at SIFs 
over a range of time periods because managed share issuance takes some time to arrange. 
Some issuance (e.g., the exercise of management options) will not be under short run 
company control. Other issuance (such as share issuance to fund a take-over) may well take 
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longer than one quarter to carry out. Gaming the system through a sequence of share 
increasing moves would take longer again. We shall look as far as six quarters into the future, 
which is a generous allowance for the implementation of a share issuance policy. 
Table 2 about here 
Table 2 shows the pattern of movement to and from the Index. As Table 1 has shown, 
SIFs that will move a company ten or more places up the capitalisation rankings are rare. 
However, natural share price movements on this scale are less rare, and Table 2 shows a 
pattern of very substantial ranking changes. 73% of companies that enter the Index were 
within ten places of entry the previous quarter, but only 13% of them were in such a 
‘proxout’ position six quarters earlier. In our data set, two companies enter the Index which 
had been ranked below 200 six quarters previously. As Table 2 shows, some entries are in 
fact re-entries. A quarter of all the companies that enter the Index were within it six quarters 
before, but have dropped out and are now returning. Some Index entrants and exits have 
moved a very long way up or down the rankings in the preceding quarters. An index game 
would have to be played against a turbulent background. 
Table 3 looks at what SIF would be required to secure FTSE entry by moving to rank 
90 if companies could theoretically change their size instantaneously. For companies in 
position +1, a modest positive SIF can sometimes do the job. A 1% SIF will move a company 
in almost 10% of the time; 5% will do it 29% of the time; and 20% would be successful for 
every case in our data set. Note that the company in position +1 is not necessarily at rank 91. 
It may be necessary to leapfrog several companies to gain immediate entry.  
Table 3 about here 
For companies further away from entry, larger SIFs would be needed. A 2.5% SIF does 
not push any company ranked +2 or above into the index. 5% only helps companies ranked 
+1 or +2. Table 3 shows that even 20% SIFs do not move companies at the bottom of the 
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proxout list into the Index. This motivates our decision to focus on companies within 10 
places of entry/exit as being the most likely to exhibit index gaming behaviour. We shall then 
go further and look at patterns of share issuance by companies within these two proximity 
groups. 
While the analysis in Table 3 has been undertaken looking at different levels of SIF, we 
shall concentrate on SIFs of 10% or more. These are large enough, as Table 3 shows, to have 
a significant effect on a company’s capitalisation ranking. They are also common enough, as 
Table 1 has shown, to give an adequate dataset.   
 
9. Results 
9.1 Testing for Strategic Gaming 
We consider the possibility that the sets of companies within 10 places of exit or entry 
to the FTSE are actively enhancing or protecting their positions. Table 4 includes all the 
eligible companies on the London Stock Exchange ranked from 1 to 200 by market 
capitalisation. The top hundred and the next hundred are divided into size deciles, except for 
the companies ranked 91-110, which are divided into 10 ‘proxins’ (the smallest firms in the 
index) and 10 ‘proxouts’ (the largest firms outside the index). We are concerned to see 
whether the share issuance behaviour of these two groups of companies is different from that 
of firms in the other 180 positions. 
Table 4 about here 
Table 4 looks at all positive SIFs exceeding 10%. The evidence that proxin 
companies, when compared to other companies in the index, have an abnormal propensity to 
make these large SIFs is very slight. Over 6 quarters, they are less likely to do so than the 
average company in the range 1-90. Over 1, 2 and 4 quarters, the propensities are modestly 
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above average, but the proxins are not the highest issuing group over any time period. There 
is no substantial evidence here of gaming. 
The evidence in Table 4 is different for the proxouts. Over 2, 4 and 6 quarters, the 
proxouts have a higher proportion of large SIFs than any other group in the 111-200 
capitalisation range. Indeed, over Q4 and Q6, the proxouts are bigger issuers than any of the 
other nineteen groups. This offers initial support for gaming by proxouts even though there is 
no such evidence for proxins. 
Share issuance is, of course, likely to be influenced by factors other than FTSE 
ranking position and whether or not the firm is close to the index boundary. We therefore add 
to the analysis as control variables three financial variables expected to influence firms’ share 
issuance behaviour. The variables, commonly used in the capital structure literature (see, for 
example Harris and Raviv, 1991) are the Debt/Total Asset ratio (DTA), the Dividend Yield 
(DY), and the Market-to-Book ratio (MBR). We also control for size using the natural log of 
market value (LnMV). The basic characteristics of these variables in our data set are given in 
Table 5. This shows that proxins have a significantly higher MBR ratio, and proxouts a lower 
one, compared to the rest of the top 200 companies. The differences in the other ratios are not 
so marked. 
Table 5 about here 
We investigate in Table 6 whether these firm characteristics can account for the high 
share issuance by proxout companies, or whether the index boundary position of a firm still 
affects SIF behaviour, which would be suggestive of gaming. In Panel A of Table 6 we report 
results of a probit analysis which seeks to explain SIF behaviour using these financial 
variables, as well as proximity to FTSE entry or exit.2 Four different time periods (Q1, Q2, 
                                                          
2 With respect to endogeneity, we do not suspect either an unobserved confounder which affects proxout/proxin 
and SIF10Q4 or a loop of causality in our framework. Only effects on the explanatory variables 
(proxout/proxin) are a concern in models in Table 6. We are not aware of any endogenous effects regarding the 
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Q4, and Q6) are analysed. The dependent variable is a dummy recording whether a SIF of the 
given size has taken place in the given period. Our main variables of interest are proxin and 
proxout, while DTA, DY, MBR and LnMV control for other factors likely to influence the 
share issuing behaviour of firms. For SIFs above 10%, the proxouts are significant at the 5% 
level over four quarters which is strong evidence of strategic gaming activity. There is 
significance at 10% over six quarters. There is no similar evidence for proxins and nothing in 
the Table supports the gaming hypothesis in their case. With regard to the control variables, 
the analysis shows that the debt ratio (DTA) has a significantly positive relationship with 
issuance (consistent with most leverage models) and MBR has a significantly negative 
relationship (consistent with the pecking order hypothesis). Dividend yields are not 
significant. However, strong evidence of gaming remains present even when these other 
variables are controlled for in the analysis. 
Table 6 about here 
Panel B of Table 6 uses the same probit approach looking specifically at Q4 data. 
Analysis of the Q6 data gives similar results but with a smaller sample size and is not 
reported here. The same regression is conducted for a number of subsets of the data. The 
regression coefficients relating to debt are noteworthy. It might be argued that proxouts 
would have a particular propensity to play the game when their debt levels were high and 
they could conveniently gain capitalisation by exchanging debt for equity. Panel B does not 
support this relationship. The link between debt and large SIFs, although consistently 
positive, is weaker for proxouts than any other subset. We extended the analysis to include 
interactive terms, but we found them to be uninformative. Overall, our results, as presented in 
Table 6 suggests the high frequency of large share issues by companies ranked just outside 
                                                          
proxout/proxin variables either through the literature or by observation which would cause both our explanatory 
variables (proxout/proxin) and SIF10Q4. There is also no reason to suspect a feedback loop between SIF10Q4 
and proxout/proxin. 
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the boundary for index membership (proxouts) cannot be fully accounted for by firm 
characteristics other than their ranking position. Our evidence is consistent with index 
gaming. 
Evidence of gaming is pursued further in Table 7. Again, it looks specifically at Q4 
SIFs above 10%. For each company the probability of generating such a SIF has been 
calculated using the probit regression in Table 6 Panel B, Model (iv). The probabilities are 
then averaged for each group of ten, with, again, companies closest to the boundary being 
divided into proxins and proxouts and all others being simply ranked by capitalisation. For 
each group of 10 the expected number of large SIFs is calculated and compared with the 
actual number observed. 
Table 7 about here 
Although the statistical significance of anomalous proxout behaviour has already been 
demonstrated in Table 6, the effect of presenting the data in this way is striking. There is no 
excess of SIFs for proxins, but for proxouts there are more than 15 excess SIFs – nearly twice 
the expected number (31 compared with an expectation of 15.92). This is the largest number 
of excess SIFs for any of the 20 groups. It is significant at the 1% level using a Chi-square 
test. It is, again, clear evidence of gaming, with companies just outside the index boundary 
having many more large share issues than would be expected by firm characteristics or 
chance. We also note that the abnormal SIF is also marginally significant for the firms ranked 
111-120, possibly suggesting that some of the firms in these positions may also have engaged 
in unusual SIF activity. Further analysis shows that the average size of the Q4 proxout SIFs is 
30.3%. However, these proxout companies can be as many as ten places away from entry, so 
even these very large SIFs may not be sufficient to gain entry.  
The fact that the gaming evidence can be found in patterns of issuance over four 
quarters (and not over one or two quarters), and by companies up to ten places from the 
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boundary is evidence of strategic gaming behaviour. Some companies are making active bids 
for FTSE membership, starting a significant distance from the boundary and continuing over 
a period of four quarters. 
The pattern may go on beyond four quarters. The 31 cases of large proxout issuance 
over four quarter periods actually relate to only 19 different companies. Only 9 out of the 19 
actually get in during the period of our study. Others, of course, may still be trying when our 
data set ends and may eventually succeed. Since slightly less than half of the 31 issuances 
have been identified as abnormal, this would suggest that, over the 8 year period of our data 
set, only about four of the 76 entries to the FTSE index have been the result of firms gaming 
the system. This number is based only on the 10 proxout companies, over four quarters, 
making SIFs above 10%. We have found that these specific parameters, among those we have 
explored, give the strongest evidence of gaming, but other model specifications might 
possibly have captured additional gaming behaviour.  
 
9.2  Testing for tactical gaming 
We now look more closely at companies within the proxin and proxout categories. We 
test to see whether the propensity to make large SIFs is highest for companies in the very 
closest proximity to entry or exit. 
Table 8 about here 
Table 8 Panel A shows the proportion of SIFs above 10% by ranking position. The 
company ranked -1 is in the index but closest to exit. Rank -10 is ten places from exit. The 
companies outside the index are similarly ranked +1 to +10. The table covers 1, 2, 4 and 6 
quarters. 
We have already shown that the proxouts, as a group, have an unusually high 
propensity to make large SIFs. But Table 8 shows that this propensity is not concentrated in 
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companies at the most marginal positions. Proxout companies at ranks 1, 2 and 3 are less 
likely, and, in some cases, significantly less likely, to issue shares than those further away 
from the boundary. The highest proportion of large share issuances happens to be associated 
with position +4, and there is no overall tendency for SIFs to increase as companies move 
closer to the border. 
For proxins the picture is different. There are no large SIFs at all in our dataset for the 
very closest companies to exit. However, there is higher issuance by the five companies 
closest to exit compared to the remaining five. 
This is investigated further in Table 8 Panel B, which shows correlations between index 
positions and SIF probabilities. Only one correlation is significant, that relating to proxouts 
over six quarters. However, it has the wrong sign for our hypothesis; large SIFs are more 
likely for companies further away from the boundary. 
The evidence, therefore, does not support tactical or opportunistic gaming by 
companies on the very margin of entry or exit. It does support strategic gaming, by 
companies outside the index, carried out over a number of quarters, by companies which may 
initially be a single-digit number of places away from the boundary. 
 
9.3 Limitations of gaming 
It is interesting to consider why more companies don’t play the game. Perhaps the 
probability of winning is too low to attract many players. Table 9 shows the risks that FTSE 
gamers would face. Over a single quarter, companies typically move a little more than 7 
places in the ranking table. Where capitalisation changes are proportional to general market 
movements, company rankings and therefore FTSE status will not be affected. However, 
after removing this element, and looking only at the firm-specific capitalisation changes, we 
find quarterly absolute changes of 12.5% for proxouts and 13.4% for proxins. These numbers 
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are larger than the 10% that we have defined as large SIFs. Such SIFs are relatively rare in 
the data set. The average quarterly SIF in Table 9 is less than 1%, which is far smaller than 
the average quarterly change in capitalisation caused by firm specific risk. Even a large 
positive SIF, therefore, might very well be counteracted by a negative change in the share 
price – or rendered unnecessary by a natural positive change in the share price. 
Table 9 about here 
 This degree of natural volatility illustrates the risk of losing for any company tempted 
to play the FTSE game. Also, manipulation of market capitalisation would come at a price. 
Issuing additional equity may involve significant transaction costs. It may also result in a tax-
inefficient low debt-equity ratio, or the acceptance of unattractive investment opportunities, 
or both. These costs are hard to quantify, but are likely to be significant when balanced 
against the highly uncertain benefits of trying to game the FTSE system. Our evidence 
suggests that some companies do find the game worthwhile, but a substantial majority do not.  
 
10. Conclusion 
Although there is a large literature relating to the effects of index membership changes, 
we believe we are the first to pose the question of whether companies manipulate their 
market capitalisations to secure or maintain membership. Based on an analysis of the FTSE 
100 index, we find evidence that they do.  
We find that some companies game to secure entry to the FTSE, but find no evidence 
of gaming to try and avoid exit. This finding is consistent with the strand in the literature 
which argues that companies benefit from a higher profile and greater awareness when they 
join the index, but do not lose this benefit when they exit. It might also be explained by the 
FTSE rules. Gaining entry offers membership with a substantial buffer against exit. A 
capitalisation increase by a company near exit offers no similar incentive. 
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Our investigation identifies two different ways of playing the game. It could be played 
tactically, with a company very close to the boundary for index inclusion grasping a fleeting 
opportunity. Or it could be played strategically, where a company which may initially be 
some distance from the boundary, makes capitalisation changes over a longer time period 
with the aim of getting into the FTSE100 index. The evidence on this point is clear. It does 
not support the tactical gaming hypothesis. Gaming is pursued strategically. Some 
companies, which may initially be up to ten places from the boundary, appear to have 
adopted an objective of building a FTSE company, and have pursued this objective 
systematically over multiple quarters. 
The game is risky. Even when played strategically, our evidence shows that only 
slightly less than half of companies in our data set which make large Q4 share issuances from 
positions just outside the index (proxout) actually gain entry. The natural volatility of market 
capitalisation can readily frustrate gaming companies. 
Although we have found clear evidence of gaming, we have also found that the amount 
of gaming is relatively modest. Within our data set, roughly 5% of companies gaining entry 
to the FTSE index appear to have used gaming. 
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Appendix: FTSE Ground Rules  
The index was originally started by choosing the 100 largest companies on the London 
Stock Exchange based on the market capitalisation of equity. Thereafter, the list of 
constituents is reviewed every quarter. The FTSE (2012) Ground Rules Section 5 provides 
detailed information on index qualification criteria and Section 6 information on the periodic 
review of constituent companies. All 90 largest eligible firms by market capitalisation are 
automatically included. If a new company enters the top 90, it pushes out the smallest 
company currently in the index. Similarly, if any index stock moves below the 110th position, 
it is automatically excluded at the next review and the largest non-index stock takes its place. 
At any point in time, therefore, the index will consist of the top 90 shares by market 
capitalisation at the beginning of the quarter plus 10 further shares drawn from those that 
were ranked, at the beginning the quarter, between 91 and 110.  
The Ground Rules outline a number of key aspects of the constitution of the FTSE 100 
index. Section 7.1.2 of the FTSE (2012) Ground Rules notes that: “Where the company to be 
removed is a constituent of the FTSE 100, the replacement company will be taken from the 
highest ranking company on the FTSE 100 Reserve List and a constituent removed from the 
FTSE 250 will be replaced by the highest ranking company on the FTSE 250 Reserve List.”3 
Reviews take place on the Wednesday after the first Friday of March, June, September and 
December.4 Changes agreed by the review are implemented after the expiration of index 
futures and options which is the third Friday of the same month.  
  
                                                          
3 With respect to M&A, Section 7.2.1. explains that “If the effect of a merger or takeover is that one constituent 
in the FTSE 100 or FTSE 250 is absorbed by another constituent, the resulting company will remain a 
constituent of the appropriate index, and a vacancy will be created. This vacancy will be filled by selecting the 
highest ranking security...”. 
4 Our data on market values and share prices is collect for the date on which the periodic review is released. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Market Value and SIFs 
Panel A Sample Mean Median Minimum Maximum Stdev. 
Market cap 561 2381.67 2413.10 1088.20 3559.00 468.81 
Market cap rank 90 561 2749.88 2763.50 1557.40 3604.20 492.91 
Market cap rank 111 561 2078.30 2079.00 1084.10 2709.30 382.88 
       
SIF Q+1 561 0.0009 0.0000 -0.3210 0.4750 0.0494 
SIF Q+2 545 0.0047 0.0000 -0.3990 0.6290 0.0733 
SIF Q+4 499 0.0073 0.0010 -0.6660 0.6590 0.1112 
SIF Q+6 449 0.0110 0.0020 -0.8600 1.2800 0.1434 
           
Panel B Proportion of observations with large SIFs  
SIF -20% -10% -5% -2.5% -1% +1% +2.5% +5% +10% +20% 
Q+1 0.0053 0.0107 0.0321 0.0515 0.0784 0.0499 0.0303 0.0232 0.0143 0.0089 
Q+2 0.0092 0.0202 0.0587 0.0899 0.1321 0.0954 0.0642 0.0569 0.0404 0.0202 
Q+4 0.0240 0.0501 0.0962 0.1543 0.2024 0.1743 0.1162 0.1062 0.0822 0.0361 
Q+6 0.0356 0.0690 0.1314 0.1849 0.2405 0.2695 0.1782 0.1514 0.1158 0.0490 
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Panel A of the table reports the 
characteristics of our sample of index boundary firms (the ten smallest companies currently within the index 
(proxin), and the 10 largest companies currently outside the index (proxout)). The analysis is based on data 
just prior to each quarterly index revision date, over the sample period from March 2005 to December 2012. 
Market cap reports the mean market capitalisation for the sample firms. Market cap rank 90 reports the 
market capitalisation at which companies would on average have gained automatic index membership by 
virtue of being ranked within the top 90 eligible companies for index inclusion, while Market cap rank 111 
indicates at what market value companies would on average have dropped out of the index by virtue of their 
market cap being smaller than that of the top 110 eligible companies. SIF Q+1 reports the average 
capitalisation change (net of any stock splits) for the sample firms over the next quarter after the ranking 
quarter, while SIF Q+2, SIF Q+4 and SIF Q+6 captures capitalisation changes over the next 2, 4 and 6 
quarters, respectively. In Panel B we report the proportion of observations with SIF values in excess of a 
certain percentage. -20% refers to the proportion of observations with a negative SIF of 20% or more, -10% 
the proportion of observations with a negative SIF in excess of 10%, etc. Note that the categories are not 
mutually exclusive, and the observations in the category -20% are included in the category of -10%, etc.  
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Table 2: Position of companies prior to entries and exits from the FTSE100 
Index 
 
Entries  Exits 
Rank 
category 
Q-1 Q-2 Q-4 Q-6  Q-1 Q-2 Q-4 Q-6 
1-10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11-20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
21-30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
31-40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
41-50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 
51-60 0.000 0.013 0.016 0.048  0.040 0.028 0.048 0.017 
61-70 0.000 0.013 0.031 0.000  0.013 0.042 0.111 0.050 
71-80 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048  0.067 0.083 0.127 0.150 
81-90 0.000 0.026 0.047 0.081  0.093 0.250 0.254 0.117 
proxin 0.000 0.079 0.188 0.081  0.787 0.472 0.175 0.200 
proxout 0.731 0.474 0.188 0.129  0.000 0.097 0.175 0.217 
111-120 0.141 0.171 0.188 0.145  0.000 0.014 0.016 0.083 
121-130 0.064 0.118 0.078 0.161  0.000 0.014 0.016 0.017 
131-140 0.051 0.013 0.109 0.048  0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 
141-150 0.000 0.053 0.063 0.113  0.000 0.000 0.032 0.017 
151-160 0.013 0.026 0.031 0.016  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 
161-170 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.048  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 
171-180 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.016  0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 
181-190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032  0.000 0.000 0.016 0.017 
191-200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Below 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.032  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 
Notes: The table reports the ranking positions of companies 1, 2, 4 and 6 quarters prior to 
entries and exits from the FTSE100 index. The numbers reported are the proportion of 
companies entering or exiting the index from each rank category. The analysis is based on 
decile portfolios based on market capitalisation, for companies ranked 1 to 200 by market 
capitalisation. Companies ranked 1-10 are the ten largest companies in the UK by market 
capitalisation, proxin are the ten smallest companies within the FTSE 100 index, while 
proxout are the largest company outside the index. Only eligible companies are included. 
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Table 3: Capitalisation Changes Required to Gain FTSE 100 Membership  
 Boundary position  1% 2.5%  5%  10% 20% 
C
o
m
p
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n
ie
s 
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ts
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e 
F
T
S
E
 
1
0
0
 i
n
d
ex
 
1 0.107 0.179 0.32.1 0.571 1.000 
2 0.000 0.000 0.16.1 0.387 0.903 
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.241 0.724 
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.563 
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.367 
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.241 
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.161 
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total sample 561 561 561 561 561 
Notes: The table reports, for the companies currently outside the FTSE 100, what proportion would gain entry 
to the index (by means of being ranked within the top 90 companies eligible for index membership in the 
UK), given a 1%, 2.5%, 5%, 10% or 20% change in market capitalisation at quarter 0. A company ranked +1 
is the largest company outside the index. 
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Table 4: SIF Increases in Excess of 10% for Largest 200 Firms 
 Market Value 
Rank 
   Q1    Q2    Q4    Q6 
C
o
m
p
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s 
in
 F
T
S
E
 1
0
0
 
in
d
ex
 
1-10 0.0037 0.0077 0.0286 0.0841 
11-20 0.0069 0.0249 0.0698 0.1017 
21-30 0.0309 0.0532 0.0923 0.1339 
31-40 0.0101 0.0210 0.0496 0.0763 
41-50 0.0034 0.0209 0.0460 0.0672 
51-60 0.0034 0.0035 0.0198 0.0493 
61-70 0.0000 0.0070 0.0577 0.1009 
71-80 0.0171 0.0213 0.0467 0.1111 
81-90 0.0000 0.0067 0.0304 0.0593 
proxin  0.0176 0.0471 0.0675 0.0833 
 Average – in 
index 0.0093 0.0213 0.0510 0.0869 
Index boundary 
C
o
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proxout 0.0133 0.0411 0.1148 0.1639 
111-120 0.0137 0.0251 0.0888 0.1429 
121-130 0.0244 0.0399 0.0723 0.1318 
131-140 0.0174 0.0403 0.0653 0.1131 
141-150 0.0112 0.0304 0.0620 0.1286 
151-160 0.0037 0.0114 0.0327 0.0541 
161-170 0.0119 0.0320 0.0682 0.0918 
171-180 0.0080 0.0328 0.0724 0.1146 
181-190 0.0157 0.0328 0.0737 0.1027 
191-200 0.0157 0.0329 0.0888 0.1354 
 Average – outside 
index 0.0136 0.0320 0.0743 0.1188 
Overall average 0.0114 0.0264 0.0622 0.1021 
Total sample 5626 5447 4953 4437 
Notes: The table reports the proportion of observations with positive share inflation factors (SIF) in 
excess of 10%. The analysis is based on decile portfolios based on market capitalisation, for companies 
ranked 1 to 200 by market capitalisation. Companies ranked 1-10 are the ten largest companies in the 
UK by market capitalisation, proxin are the ten smallest companies within the FTSE 100 index, while 
proxout are the largest company outside the index. SIF captures the fractional change in the number of 
shares issued (adjusted for share splits, as appropriate) at the relevant quarter relative to quarter 0. Thus, 
for a company increasing its number of shares over time, the SIF number will be positive in quarters 
after the ranking quarter (Q+1 to Q+6). 
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Table 5: Financial Characteristics of the Boundary Firms 
 proxout 
sample 
proxout 
mean 
proxin 
sample 
proxin 
mean 
nonprox 
sample 
nonprox 
mean 
DTA 272 0.2508 273 0.2529 4839 0.2304** 
DY 272 2.7576*** 273 3.0501** 4839 3.0294 
MBR 272 3.0256** 273 4.1404** 4839 3.6856 
MV 272 2274.88*** 273 2779.86*** 4839 8627.45*** 
Notes: The table shows a comparison of the mean values for firm characteristics for a balanced sample using 
the data for quarter 0 after exclusion of outliers. DTA is debt divided by total assets. DY is the dividend yield, 
MBR is the Market to Book ratio, MV is the market value of the company at quarter 0. Results are reported 
are after trimming outliers (negative MBR (146 observations) and MBR above 100 (39 observations)). 
Significance of an independent samples t-test is conducted as follows: proxout significance is vs nonprox; 
proxin significance is vs proxout; nonprox significance is vs proxin. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 6 Panel A: Probit analysis of companies making large issues 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
DV SIF>+10% SIF>+10% SIF>+10% SIF>+10% 
Q+ 1 2 4 6 
proxout 0.0649 0.2172 0.3055** 0.2588* 
proxin -0.0037 0.0839 -0.1344 -0.2973 
DTA 0.6561** 0.7577** 0.7154** 0.7751** 
DY 0.0038 0.0300 0.0367 0.0228 
MBR -0.1202*** -0.0894*** -0.0645** -0.0594** 
LnMV -0.0383 -0.0552 -0.0421 -0.0321 
Cons. -1.8555 -1.5735 -1.3272 -1.1043 
     
Wald chi2 12.79 18.06 19.06 16.58 
Prob > chi2 0.0465 0.0061 0.0041 0.0110 
Pseudo R2 0.0363 0.0412 0.0343 0.0294 
Total sample 5126 4996 4534 4046 
Notes: The table reports regression output from probit models for the probability of 
firms to make large share issues. Panel A reports coefficients for probit models for 
large issues, while Panel B reports coefficient for probit models for subsamples of 
large issues. DV represents the dependent variable for the model. SIF represents the 
share inflation factor between quarter 0 and the subsequent quarter indicated (Q+). 
Dependent variables are dummy variables representing whether the company has 
issued or repurchased more than 2.5% or 10% of market capitalisation. proxout 
represents a dummy variable indicating that the company is in the largest ten 
companies outside the index at t0, proxin is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 
if the company is in the smallest ten companies which are in the index. DTA is Debt 
divided by total assets, DY is the dividend yield, MBR is the market-to-book ratio, 
LnMV is the natural log of the company’s market value and Cons. is the regression 
constant. In Panel B, subsamples are All observations in model (i); proxout only in 
model (ii); proxin only in model (iii); non-proximity observations in the all sample in 
model (iv); Non-proximity observations inside the FTSE index in model (v); and Non-
proximity observations outside the index in model (vi). Results reported are after 
trimming outliers (negative MBR (146 observations) and MBR above 100 (39 
observations)). Significance of t-statistic is estimated using clustered robust standard 
errors using firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. 
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Table 6 Panel B: Probit analysis of subsamples of companies making large issues 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Sample all proxout only proxin only non-prox (in or out) nonprox (rank ≤ 100) nonprox (rank >100) 
DV SIF>+10% SIF>+10% SIF>+10% SIF>+10% SIF>+10% SIF>+10% 
Q+ 4 4 4 4 4 4 
DTA 0.7336** 0.6024 3.2510*** 0.6441* 0.7463 0.7427* 
DY 0.0342 -0.0768 0.1211 0.0373 0.0457 0.0307 
MBR -0.0655** -0.2888** -0.2448** -0.0551* -0.0502 -0.0672 
LnMV -0.0463 0.4700 -0.3844 -0.0420 0.0047 -0.1795 
Cons. -1.2735 -4.1401 0.4266 -1.3369 -1.8479 -0.3082 
       
Wald chi2 12.97 5.09 27.48 11.03 5.23 8.38 
Prob > chi2 0.0114 0.2783 0.0000 0.0263 0.2643 0.0786 
Pseudo R2 0.0307 0.0773 0.2354 0.0260 0.0260 0.0340 
Total sample 4534 226 219 4089 2305 2003 
Notes: The table reports regression output from probit models for the probability of firms to make large share issues. Panel A reports coefficients for 
probit models for large issues, while Panel B reports coefficient for probit models for subsamples of large issues. DV represents the dependent variable 
for the model. SIF represents the share inflation factor between quarter 0 and the subsequent quarter indicated (Q+). Dependent variables are dummy 
variables representing whether the company has issued or repurchased more than 2.5% or 10% of market capitalisation. proxout represents a dummy 
variable indicating that the company is in the largest ten companies outside the index at t0, proxin is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the 
company is in the smallest ten companies which are in the index. DTA is Debt divided by total assets, DY is the dividend yield, MBR is the market-to-
book ratio, LnMV is the natural log of the company’s market value and Cons. is the regression constant. In Panel B, subsamples are All observations in 
model (i); proxout only in model (ii); proxin only in model (iii); non-proximity observations in the all sample in model (iv); Non-proximity observations 
inside the FTSE index in model (v); and Non-proximity observations outside the index in model (vi). Results reported are after trimming outliers 
(negative MBR (146 observations) and MBR above 100 (39 observations)). Significance of t-statistic is estimated using clustered robust standard errors 
using firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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Table 7: Predicted and Actual probability of large SIF 
Rank 
category p N 
Predicted 
SIF10% 
Actual 
SIF10% 
Abnormal 
SIF10% 
1-10 0.0474 227 10.76 7** -3.76 
11-20 0.0511 256 13.08 20 6.92 
21-30 0.0510 248 12.66 27*** 14.34 
31-40 0.0502 247 12.39 13 0.61 
41-50 0.0559 249 13.91 14 0.09 
 
51-60 0.0587 237 13.92 8** -5.92 
61-70 0.0604 232 14.00 15 1.00 
71-80 0.0619 223 13.79 10* -3.79 
81-90 0.0626 203 12.70 10 -2.70 
Proxin 0.0620 237 14.69 16 1.31 
Proxout 0.0629 253 15.92 31*** 15.08 
111-120 0.0629 233 14.66 22* 7.34 
121-130 0.0615 228 14.01 18 3.98 
131-140 0.0608 217 13.20 15 1.80 
141-150 0.0610 220 13.42 15 1.57 
151-160 0.0608 210 12.77 9* -3.77 
161-170 0.0652 201 13.10 16 2.90 
171-180 0.0659 196 12.93 15 2.08 
181-190 0.0651 193 12.57 11 -1.57 
191-200 0.0641 184 11.79 16 4.21 
The table reports Predicted, Actual and Abnormal SIFs in excess of 10% for Q4. 
The analysis is based on decile portfolios based on market capitalisation, for 
companies ranked 1 to 200 by market capitalisation. Companies ranked 1-10 are 
the ten largest companies in the UK by market capitalisation, proxin are the ten 
smallest companies within the FTSE 100 index, while proxout are the largest 
company outside the index. Predicted number of large SIFs, denoted by 
Predicted SIF10%, is estimated by multiplying the probability of a large SIF (p) 
by the number of observations in each rank category (N). p is estimated as the 
average probability of a large SIF for observations within the relevant rank 
category, using Model (iv) in Table 6 Panel B. Abnormal SIF10%, the abnormal 
number of large SIFs, is estimated as the difference between the Actual and 
Predicted number of SIFs in excess of 10%.  Statistical significance is estimated 
using a Chi-Square test. ***, ** and * indicates significance of the difference 
between the number of actual announcements in the specified rank category with 
the predicted value at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Overall average 0.0160 0.0422 0.0862 0.1247 
Total sample 561 545 499 449 
Panel B 
Absolute Value    Q1    Q2    Q4    Q6 
Boundary position -0.0319 -0.0111 0.0174 0.0526 
In Index 0.0494 0.0762 0.0408 0.0734 
Outside Index -0.0123 0.0493 0.0538 0.1315** 
Panel A reports the proportion of observations with positive share inflation factors (SIF) in excess of 10% 
over periods up to six quarters after the ranking quarter (quarter 0), for companies close to the FTSE 100 
membership boundary. Companies ranked -10 to -1 are constituent firms of the FTSE 100 index, with 
company ranked -1 the smallest company in the index, while companies ranked +1 to +10 are outside the 
index, with a company ranked +1 the largest company outside the index. SIF captures the fractional change 
in the number of shares issued (adjusted for share splits, as appropriate) at the relevant quarter relative to 
quarter 0. Thus, for a company increasing its number of shares over time, the SIF number will be positive in 
quarters after the ranking quarter (Q+1 to Q+6). We test whether the proportion of companies in a particular 
ranking position in the index (e.g., -1) with large SIF differ from that of companies in other boundary 
positions within the index (positions -10 to -2), and similarly for boundary firms outside the index (positions 
+1 to +10 compared to each other), using a Chi-Square test. +++. ++, + indicates the proportion is 
significantly higher than that for the other categories, while ---, --, and - indicates the proportion is 
significantly lower than that for the other categories, at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Panel B reports the 
correlation between the absolute value of index positions, i.e., the proximity to the index boundary, and the 
dummy variable indicating SIFs of over 10% over periods of up to six quarters after the ranking quarter 
(Q0). Boundary Position is the absolute value of the index position from -10 to +10; In Index indicates the 
position of companies relative to the boundary which are inside the FTSE100 index; Outside Index indicates 
Table 8: SIF Increases in Excess of 10% by Boundary Firms 
Panel A 
 Boundary 
position 
   Q1    Q2    Q4    Q6 
C
o
m
p
a
n
ie
s 
in
 F
T
S
E
 1
0
0
 
in
d
ex
 
-10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
-9 0.0400 0.0400 0.0909 0.1053 
-8 0.0000 0.0357 0.0400 0.0435 
-7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
-6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0385 0.0417 
-5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0800 
-4 0.0345 0.1333++ 0.1481+ 0.2000++ 
-3 0.0690+ 0.1071+ 0.1154 0.0870 
-2 0.0323 0.0690 0.0769 0.1818+ 
-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Average – in 
index 0.0180 0.0407 0.0569 0.0769 
Index boundary 
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1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0870 
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0385 0.0435- 
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000-- 0.0400-- 
4 0.0625+ 0.1333++ 0.2143+ 0.2917+ 
5 0.0333 0.1071 0.1923 0.2500 
6 0.0000 0.0345 0.1852 0.1667 
7 0.0323 0.0667 0.1429 0.2083 
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0769 0.2083 
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0455 0.2500 
10 0.0000 0.1000 0.1667 0.1765 
 Average – 
outside index 0.0141 0.0436 0.1146 0.1711 
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the position of companies relative to the boundary which are outside the index.**indicates the Pearson 
correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 9: Absolute Changes in Rank, SIF and Firm Specific Variability 
  Proximity N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
One Quarter           
Rank all 4873 7.24 4 8.84 0 88 
SIF all 4873 0.007 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.357 
FS all 4873 0.120 0.089 0.123 0.000 1.781 
        
Rank proxin 203 8.29 6 9.01 0 58 
SIF proxin 203 0.008 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.188 
FS proxin 203 0.134 0.101 0.128 0.001 0.934 
        
Rank proxout 247 8.75 6 8.77 0 62 
SIF proxout 247 0.007 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.166 
FS proxout 247 0.125 0.095 0.117 0.000 0.535 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the absolute values of changes in rank position, the share inflation 
factor (SIF) and the firm-specific (FS) change in the market capitalisation of equity (i.e., adjusting the market 
value change for the change in the FTSE 100 stock market index level). FS captures the firm-specific market 
value change in excess of the change in the overall FTSE 100 index level, and is calculated as FS =
⃓(
MVq ×(Index0/Index1) – MV0)
MV0
]⃓, where Index0 is the FTSE 100 index value at time 0, Index1 is the FTSE 100 
index value at time 1, MV0 is the market value of the company at time 0, and MV1 is the market value for the 
firm in quarter 1. We calculate the absolute value of FS, as indicated by | | in the equation. ‘all’ refers to the 
full sample of companies ranked 1-200 by the market capitalisation of equity, ‘proxin’ to the ten smallest 
companies within the FTSE100 index, and ‘proxout’ to the ten largest companies outside the index. 
 
